Russia's military support activities on the Crimean peninsula -- and hence its entire Ukraine campaign -- face a drastic reversal unless Vladimir Putin's forces can hold the southeastern bank of the Dnipro River.
That is why Russians have dug in their crack troops along the river in Kherson Oblast (province). They must stop the Ukrainians from taking that ground -- otherwise Crimea loses access to the 86% of its water that is taken from the Dnipro via the North Crimean Canal.
After Putin's stooges seized Crimea in 2014, Ukraine cut the canal flow to a trickle with a sandbag-type dam and another concrete dam not far from the river. After Russian forces took Kherson earlier this year, Russia blew up the dams and resumed the supply of water. Enthusiasm among ethnic Russians in Crimea for Putin had waned as agriculture and tourism were greatly hampered by the water crisis.
With Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February came major naval and land force buildups in Crimea. Though potable water might be shipped by rail tanker across the Kerch Strait bridge, it was very unlikely to have sufficed for the large increase in manpower. Also, every tanker shipping water was not shipping fuel. Much of Russia's logistics efforts remain hinged on the Kerch bridge linking Russia and Crimea, even after the bridge was damaged by a truck bomb in October.
Any sudden cutoff in water to Crimea is liable to have a dire effect on the continuation of larger scale forces there. The salt water of the Black and Azov seas can be desalinated -- theoretically. But it takes time to get large systems up to speed -- if Russia even has the parts necessary for such projects.
Hence, despite all the complaints of the hawks about the fall of Kherson City, professional commanders understand that an enormous effort must be put into holding the other side of the Dnipro, or suffer far more catastrophic setbacks.
Yet, though Russia's crack airborne and special forces units are said to be well-entrenched, that doesn't necessarily mean the Ukrainians will find them unduly hard to dislodge. Perhaps that's how it will go. But on the other hand we have seen repeatedly how the Ukrainian forces adapt new tactics to the battlefield, often deploying NATO arms in initially surprising ways. The Ukrainians also show expert generalship and have used real guile to win major victories.
That is why Russians have dug in their crack troops along the river in Kherson Oblast (province). They must stop the Ukrainians from taking that ground -- otherwise Crimea loses access to the 86% of its water that is taken from the Dnipro via the North Crimean Canal.
After Putin's stooges seized Crimea in 2014, Ukraine cut the canal flow to a trickle with a sandbag-type dam and another concrete dam not far from the river. After Russian forces took Kherson earlier this year, Russia blew up the dams and resumed the supply of water. Enthusiasm among ethnic Russians in Crimea for Putin had waned as agriculture and tourism were greatly hampered by the water crisis.
With Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February came major naval and land force buildups in Crimea. Though potable water might be shipped by rail tanker across the Kerch Strait bridge, it was very unlikely to have sufficed for the large increase in manpower. Also, every tanker shipping water was not shipping fuel. Much of Russia's logistics efforts remain hinged on the Kerch bridge linking Russia and Crimea, even after the bridge was damaged by a truck bomb in October.
Any sudden cutoff in water to Crimea is liable to have a dire effect on the continuation of larger scale forces there. The salt water of the Black and Azov seas can be desalinated -- theoretically. But it takes time to get large systems up to speed -- if Russia even has the parts necessary for such projects.
Hence, despite all the complaints of the hawks about the fall of Kherson City, professional commanders understand that an enormous effort must be put into holding the other side of the Dnipro, or suffer far more catastrophic setbacks.
Yet, though Russia's crack airborne and special forces units are said to be well-entrenched, that doesn't necessarily mean the Ukrainians will find them unduly hard to dislodge. Perhaps that's how it will go. But on the other hand we have seen repeatedly how the Ukrainian forces adapt new tactics to the battlefield, often deploying NATO arms in initially surprising ways. The Ukrainians also show expert generalship and have used real guile to win major victories.
Maps borrowed from internet sources.
